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Abstract. The study assesses and compares the value relevance (VR) of accounting num-
bers in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity and so possible 
earnings management (EM) behaviours, testing whether and in what extent the quality 
of enforcement and governance mechanisms act as moderating factors on the relation 
EM-VR. Based on a sample of 2 667 European non-financial entities, the results show 
that while the VR of earnings is low in entities that experienced high discretionary ac-
cruals intensity, book value increases its VR. The study also shows that the quality of en-
forcement mechanisms and the ownership diffusion (that proxies the quality of corporate 
governance) are effectively able to obstruct the loss of VR of earnings. The value added 
of the paper consists in showing that both the quality of enforcement and the ownership 
diffusion contrast only in part and in different manner the loss of VR of earnings, due to 
the presence of EM behaviours, acting only in part as moderating factors. 
Keywords: earnings management, value relevance, legal enforcement, corporate govern-
ance, ownership diffusion, European Union (EU).
JEL Classification: M41, G1.
Introduction
Scholars that investigated the relationship between EM and VR found that opportunis-
tic behaviours of managers impair the weight investors place on earnings (Marquardt, 
Wiedman 2004). For book value, the debate is open; in fact, while some of them ob-
served a reduction of its VR (Lang et al. 2006), other evidenced its increase (Marquardt, 
Wiedman 2004). This paper would like to contribute to this debate, studying whether the 
association between market prices and accounting amounts (earnings and book value) 
changes when managers opportunistically behave against the interests of external share-
holders. The paper also aims at investigating whether and in what extent some factors, 
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such as legal enforcement and ownership diffusion (our proxy of high quality corporate 
governance) act as moderating factor, obstructing the loss of VR of accounting amounts 
in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity. This is the value added 
of this paper; in fact, scholars focused on the ability of enforcement or of the quality 
of corporate governance simply to obstruct EM, not considering either that they could 
act as moderating factors or that they can obstruct the loss of VR due to opportunistic 
behaviours in different manner depending on whether we refer to usefulness or timeli-
ness of accounting amounts. 
To perform the study, we base on a sample of 2 667 listed entities (after eliminations). 
We use the Amadeus database to download data referred to the consolidated financial 
statements for the period 2009–2014 (16 002 firm-year observations). 
Our research requires measuring EM, legal enforcement and ownership diffusion and 
choosing a model to asses the VR of accounting figures. The results obtained show that 
the VR of earnings decreases in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals 
intensity, while book value increases its VR in these entities. Moreover, both the quality 
of enforcement and governance mechanisms compensate in part the fall of the VR of 
earnings in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity. Our findings 
suggest that such mechanisms – that could be considered control factors for EM – seem 
to be more effective to compensate usefulness rather than timeliness of earnings. In 
this sense, our findings contribute to the literature showing that EM influences VR of 
financial reporting and that enforcement and some governance characteristics act only 
in part as moderating factors, obstructing the loss of usefulness and of timeliness of ac-
counting amounts. These results may be useful for firms, professionals, regulators and 
investors, because they show the importance of the quality of financial reporting for 
investors’ strategies and the importance of environment and firm factors to control the 
negative effects of EM on VR of accounting amounts. 
1. Literature review and research hypotheses development
This study addresses a first research question investigating whether the association be-
tween market prices and accounting amounts changes in the extent of which managers 
opportunistically behave against the interests of external shareholders. From this ques-
tion, we understand that this work deals with two dimensions of the accounting quality 
(Barth et al. 2008), that are VR and accrual-accounting EM. 
VR refers to the ability of accounting amounts to reflect the underlying economic value 
of a firm (Hung, Subramanyam 2007: 639). EM occurs when managers use judgments 
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the com-
pany or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers 
(Healy, Wahlen 1999: 365). Incentives for manipulating earnings include capital market 
expectations, contracts written in terms of accounting numbers and antitrust or other 
government regulation (Healy, Wahlen 1999: 370).
Investigating the capability of EM to affect the VR of accounting amounts, scholars find 
contradictory results. For instance, Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) analyse whether EM 
impairs the VR of accounting information as reflected in stock prices. They find that 
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while in presence of EM net income is less value relevant in determining stock prices, 
book value plays a greater role in equity valuation even though accounting information 
is less useful overall in determining stock prices. More recently, Lang et al. (2006) find 
that non-US firms show more evidence of EM than US firms, and both their earnings 
and book value exhibit a lower association with share prices.
According to the above-mentioned scholars, while EM seems to negatively affect the 
earnings’ VR, mixed results have been found for the VR of book value. On the one 
hand, this could be due to the fact that scholars focused on entities listed in different 
countries and adopted different accounting standards. On the other hand, such results 
depend on the assumption related to the shape of the function of equity value with both 
earnings and book value. Consistently with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997: 188), consid-
ering the market value of equity a convex function of earnings and book value, any loss 
of VR of earnings leads investors to place more weight on book value. To understand 
why, take into account that while earnings incorporate the option to continue the pre-
sent activities with the current business technology (e.g., recursion value/option), book 
value incorporates the adaptation option, that is, the possibility to adapt the resources to 
alternative uses independently from their business technology (e.g., adaptation value/op-
tion). The adaptation option includes both the (rare) liquidation option and any form of 
internal change and reorganization. In a valuation model, when the earnings coefficient 
drops – perhaps due to EM behaviours – book value becomes the real determinant of the 
equity value, over which investors place more weight because the increased importance 
of the adaptation option compared with the recursion option. In fact, when the VR of 
earnings decreases, the firm exercises the adaptation option with a higher probability 
than it exercises the recursion option. So, the presence in the samples analysed of both 
entities that reported losses or that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity 
impairs the VR of earnings (Hayn 1995) and should increase the VR of book value. In 
case of losses, book value increases its VR thanks to the liquidation option; in case of 
EM behaviours also for changes and reorganizations. In this regard, there are papers 
that documented such changes/reorganizations that show how after period of high EM 
behaviours, entities do spin offs (Miloud 2013) or decide to go public with an Initial 
Public Offering (Lin, Yung 2014).
Therefore, assuming discretionary accruals a proxy of the presence of EM and that the 
equity value is a convex function of earnings and book value, our research hypotheses 
are the following:
H1A: Earnings disclosed by entities that experiment high discretionary accruals inten-
sity are less value relevant than the ones disclosed by entities where EM is low.
H1B: Book value disclosed by entities that experiment high discretionary accruals in-
tensity is more value relevant than the one of entities where EM is low.
A second research question addressed by this paper regards the ability of legal enforce-
ment and corporate governance to act as moderating factors, obstructing the fall of VR 
of earnings due to EM.
Few papers investigate this topic. More in general, we can find papers that show the 
ability of enforcement and corporate governance to positively affect VR (Olsen, Elango 
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2005; Song et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2015) or to reduce EM behaviours. None of them 
show if such mechanisms are enough to obstruct the fall of VR due to EM, acting as 
moderating factors. For instance, Leuz et al. (2003) show that EM is negatively associ-
ated with the quality of minority shareholder rights and legal enforcement. The different 
enforcement regimes could explain the reasons why the first-time adoption of IFRS in 
EU produced different effects on EM depending on the country analysed and the kind 
of EM investigated (Mechelli, Cimini 2012).
As to the quality of corporate governance, Kent et al. (2010) found that the quality 
of governance mechanisms increases the quality of discretionary accruals. Among the 
governance mechanisms, according to Alves (2012), the ownership structure of a firm 
is considered an important managers’ monitoring mechanism, so it may have a monitor-
ing role in constraining EM. Some researchers find that when management ownership 
increases, the incentives to manipulate earnings will decrease (Ali et al. 2008). Actually, 
large shareholders, not interested in monitoring, may intervene in the firm’s manage-
ment, and may encourage managers to engage in EM to maximise their private benefits 
(Jaggi, Tsui 2007). Supporting the thesis that companies with the most concentrated 
ownership are those that rely less on high quality governance mechanisms, Stefǎnescu 
(2012) provides all the references that support the thesis that ownership diffusion is 
appreciated as a required feature for a good corporate governance. This is thanks to 
the impossibility of shareholders to influence the company’s reporting practices and 
the shareholder’s intention to scrutinize managerial performance; otherwise, ownership 
concentration is appreciated as an issue of bad governance because of the low corporate 
transparency and the high agency costs. 
If both the quality of legal enforcement and corporate governance are able to obstruct 
EM, it is reasonable to hypothesize that, in the subset of companies with high discre-
tionary accruals intensity, investors place more weight on earnings disclosed by those 
with high quality corporate governance and/or listed in countries with high quality 
enforcement.
Therefore, our research hypothesis is the following:
H2: The high quality of enforcement and ownership diffusion positively affect the VR 
of the reported earnings in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals 
intensity.
2. Research protocol
2.1. Operationalization of DAit 
Scholars extensively investigated accrual-accounting EM introducing in the literature a 
considerable number of specifications whose common purpose is to detect whether and 
how insiders carried out opportunistic behaviours against the interest of stakeholders. 
In this paper, to estimate discretionary accruals, we use the model of Larcker and Rich-
ardson (2004) whose specification is the following:
 
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 ,it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
TA REV REC PPE MB CFO
A A A A A A− − − − − −
∆ − ∆
=δ + δ + δ + δ + δ + ε  (1)
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where: TAit are total accruals; DREVit – DRECit is the difference between the change 
in revenues and the change in receivables; PPEit is the property, plant, and equipment; 
MBit is the market-to-book ratio; CFOit is the cash flow from operations; Ait–1 are the 
lagged total assets. 
The residuals of Eq. (1) has been considered our measure of discretionary accruals 
(DAit), that in the accounting literature are considered a proxy of EM. To identify enti-
ties that experienced high and low discretionary accruals intensity, first we calculate the 
absolute value of DAit and then we split this new variable at the median to calculate 
dDAit that identifies entities that experienced high (dDAit = 1) and low (dDAit = 0) 
discretionary accruals intensity. In the former, EM behaviours are more probable than 
in the latter. 
2.2. Operationalization of ENFit and GOVit
According to our second research hypothesis, both the quality of enforcement mecha-
nisms and corporate governance positively affect the VR of earnings in entities that 
experienced high discretionary accruals intensity.
To control for the quality of the enforcement mechanisms in the environment in which 
entities are listed, we downloaded the Worldwide Governance Indicators. These six vari-
ables, available from the World Bank’s on-line databases are Regulatory Quality (RQit), 
Rule of Law (RLit), Government Effectiveness (GEit), Voice and Accountability (VAit), 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAVit) and Control of Corruption (CCit). 
Moving from these initial variables, using the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
we assess a single aggregate score (ENFit) that is a metric which proxies the quality of 
enforcement mechanisms of the countries in which entities are listed. 
Once assessed ENFit we split it at the median to identify countries with high (dENFit = 
1) and low (dENFit = 0) quality of enforcement mechanisms. The former are those with 
ENFit over the median and the latter are those with ENFit under the median.
For the quality of corporate governance, we use as proxy the ownership structure. Our 
interest towards the ownership structure is due to the fact that it decreases incentives to 
manipulate accounting amounts (Ali et al. 2008) because, acting as monitoring mecha-
nisms (Alves 2012), it can have a huge impact on corporate governance, supervision of 
boards of directors, and eventually on firm value (Zahedi et al. 2015: 903). In addition, 
according to Nguyen et al. (2015: 40), the accounting literature on the relationship be-
tween ownership structure and earnings informativeness yielded inconclusive results. 
Finally, the fact that this information is available on a database avoids limitations typical 
of studies that, for example, focus on board diversity as feature of high quality corporate 
governance. In this regard, Ararat et al. (2015) consider, between the limitations of their 
paper, the small sample size and the single-country context which were necessitated 
by manual data collection. In this regard, for data regarding the ownership structure, 
we use the Bvd independence indicator; it is calculated by Bureau Van Dick and as-
signs a letter (from A to D) to distinguish different kinds of ownership concentration/
diffusion. In this regard, while letter A) qualifies the “independent companies”, letter 
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D) qualifies the “direct majority owned”. With the ownership diffusion appreciated as 
a required feature for a good governance mechanism, this study assigns to each letter 
of the independence indicator a number. The variable that we called GOVit ranges from 
1 to 10 and proxies for the quality of corporate governance. The higher is the number, 
the lower is the concentration and the higher is the degree of independence of the en-
tity. Similar to our enforcement metric, once assessed GOVit we split it at the median 
to identify entities with high (dGOVit = 1) and low (dGOVit = 0) quality of governance 
mechanisms. The former are those with GOVit over the median and the latter are those 
with GOVit under the median.
The use of dummies to control for the intensity of discretionary accruals, for the corpo-
rate governance and enforcement mechanisms is due to the easier interpretation of the 
coefficients of the VR models presented in the following sub-section. 
2.3. VR specifications
To assess and compare the VR of accounting amounts, we use both a price model and 
a return model. The price models are used to measure the usefulness of accounting 
amounts for investors’ decisions in the extent of which they are able to predict future 
cash flow. The return models control for timeliness of accounting amounts. The price 
model that we use to test H1A, H1B and H2 is the modified version of the Ohlson (1995) 
model, whose specification is the following: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 1 1 ,
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
it it it it t s it
MV NI dDA xNI dENF xdDA xNI
dGOV xdDA xNI BV dDA xBV dDA
dENF xdDA dGOV xdDA T S− −
= α + α + α + α +
α + α + α + α +
α + α + α + α + ε
  (2)
where: MVit, refers to the market value at the reporting date; NIit, is net income; BVit, 
is book value; dDAit is a dummy that controls for the discretionary accruals intensity; 
dENFit is a dummy that controls for the quality of enforcement mechanisms; dGOVit is 
a dummy that controls for the ownership diffusion; T and S are dummy variables that 
control for the time and the industry fixed-effects. 
To prevent outliers introduce bias in the results, we winsorised variables at 1%. 
The return model that we use to test H1A and H2 (not H1B being timeliness a property of 
earnings), is the one of Easton and Harris (1991) whose specification is the following:
0 1 2 3
1 1 1
it it it
it it it it
it it it
NIPS NIPS NIPSRET dDA x dENF xdDA x
P P P− − −
= β + β + β + β +






NIPS NIPS NIPSdGOV xdDA x dDA x
P P P− − −
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β + β + β +




it it it it
it it
NIPS NIPSdENF xdDA x dGOV xdDA x
P P− −
∆ ∆
β + β +
 9 10 11 1 1 ,it it it it it t s itdDA dENF xdDA dGOV xdDA T S− −β + β + β + β + β + ε  (3)
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where: RETit refers to the 12-month actual returns; NIPSit is the net income per-share 
deflated by the share prices at the beginning of the period; DNIPSit, is the change of 
net income per-share deflated by the share prices at the beginning of the period; Pit–1 
refers to the lagged share prices.
Also the specification of the return model has variables winsorised at 1%.
To test our research hypotheses, we consider as measure of VR the magnitude of the 
regression coefficients if statistically significant at 5%. 
H1A is validated whether the regression coefficient of the price (return) model α2 (β2) is 
negative and statistically significant. This means that the VR of earnings in entities that 
experienced high discretionary accruals intensity (α1+α2 in the price model and β1+ β2 
in the return model) is lower and statistically different than the VR of earnings reported 
by entities that experienced lower discretionary accruals intensity (α1 in the price model 
and β1 in the return model).
To validate H1B, using Eq. (2) we expect to find the regression coefficient α6 to be 
positive and statistically significant. This coefficient measures the difference of the VR 
of book value in entities that experienced a high (α5+α6) and a low (α5) discretionary 
accruals intensity. This will confirm that the value of the adaptation option incorporated 
in book value increases when investors place less weight on the coefficient of earnings 
that incorporates the recursion option.
Moving to our last research hypothesis, using the price (return) model, we expect to find 
α3 and α4 (β3 and β4, β7 and β8) positive and statistically significant. This means that 
both the quality of enforcement and governance mechanisms positively affect the VR 
of earnings in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity. 
3. Sample selection and empirical findings
To implement our research protocol, we use the Amadeus database to download data 
referred to the consolidated financial statements of entities listed on the stock markets 
of the countries that belonged to the EU at the time of issuance of EU Regulation 
1606/2002 other than the information that regard the ownership structure. The lists of 
entities numbers 5 252 non-financial entities whose data have been downloaded from 
the period 2009–2014. Taking into account that we eliminated 2 585 entities for missing 
data, our final sample consists of 2 667 entities (e.g., 16 002 firm-year observations).
Table 1 tabulates data related to the geographical portrait of the entities analysed.
The table shows that our sample selection strategy leads us to analyse entities listed in 
14 European countries. We have not considered those listed in Denmark because of the 
eliminations due to missing data. 
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Table 1. Geographical portrait of the firm-year observations analysed
Countries Firm-year observations Countries Firm-year observations
Austria 60 Luxembourg 48
Belgium 192 Netherland 276
Finland 468 Portugal 222
France 3 000 Spain 528
Germany 2 952 Sweden 1 230




Table 2 provides the regression parameters of Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) estimated using the 
OLS distinguishing those of the price model (panel a) and those of the return model 
(panel b).
Table 2. Research results
 Panel a) Coefficient T-statistic P-value
NIit +8.72 +77.47 0.00
dDAitxNIit –5.19 –23.65 0.00
dENFitxdDAitxNIit +0.68 +5.20 0.00
dGOVitxdDAitxNIit +3.06 +18.13 0.00
BVit +0.84 +55.34 0.00
dDAitx BVit +0.04 +2.23 0.03
dDAit –11 567.20 –2.12 0.03
dENFitxdDAit +13 006.16 +0.26 0.79
dGOVitxdDAit +175 173.00 +3.36 0.01
Intercept –306 183.40 –0.36 0.72
 Panel b) Coefficient T-statistic P-value
NIPSit/ Pit-1 +0.49 +14.02 0.00
dDAitxNIPSit/ Pit-1 –0.42 –10.87 0.00
dENFitxdDAitxNIPSit/ Pit-1 +0.05 +2.41 0.02
dGOVitxdDAitxNIPSit/ Pit-1 +0.07 +3.34 0.02
DNIPSit/ Pit-1 +0.30 +8.87 0.00
dDAitxDNIPSit/ Pit-1 –0.17 –3.96 0.00
dENFitxdDAitxDNIPSit/ Pit-1 +0.14 +4.84 0.00
dGOVitxdDAitxDNIPSit/ Pit-1 –0.02 –0.59 0.56
dDAit –0.18 –12.38 0.00
dENFitxdDAit 0.09 +7.31 0.00
dGOVitxdDAit +0.05 +4.15 0.00
Intercept +0.10 +0.37 0.71
1294
S. Callao et al. Value relevance of accounting figures in presence of earnings management ...
Results tabulated in panels a) and b) validate our research hypotheses. 
The VR of earnings reported by entities that do not experienced high discretionary ac-
cruals intensity is +8.72 in the price model (α1) and +0.49 in the return model (β1). On 
the contrary, in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity, the VR of 
earnings is lower. In the price model is +3.53 (α1 + α2) and in the return model is +0.07 
(β1 + β2). Therefore, while the price model allows us to conclude that, in entities that 
experienced high discretionary accruals intensity, earnings are less useful for investors’ 
decisions, the return model suggests that they are less timely. As to VR of book value, 
findings also validate the hypothesis that investors consider it more useful. The VR of 
book value in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity is higher 
(+0.88, that is α5+α6) that in the other group of entities (+0.84, that is α5). 
These results show, in the price model, a transfer of the explanatory power of the earn-
ings to the book value. It confirms the convexity of the function relating the market 
value to book value and earnings (Burgstahler, Dichev 1997). EM practices primarily 
affect earnings, and it is associated with low earnings informativeness and higher VR 
of book value. 
Our results also show that both the quality of enforcement mechanisms and the owner-
ship diffusion obstruct only in part the fall of the VR, that is usefulness and timeliness, 
of earnings in entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity. For use-
fulness, results disclosed in Table 2 show that, in the price model, high quality legal 
systems increase the VR of earnings in entities that experienced high accruals intensity 
being the coefficient of the interaction term α3 positive (+0.68) and statistically signifi-
cant at 1%. Also the ownership diffusion has a similar effect on the VR of earnings in 
entities that experienced high discretionary accruals intensity, being the coefficient of 
the interaction term α4 positive (+3.06) and statistically significant at 1%. For timeli-
ness, the return model suggests that high quality legal systems increase the VR of earn-
ings disclosed by entities that experienced high accruals intensity. The interaction terms 
β3 and β7 are positive (+0.05 and +0.14) and statistically significant (at 5% and at 1%). 
The ownership diffusion has a similar effect but weaker compared with the quality of 
legal systems. In fact, only the interaction term β4 is positive (+0.07) and statistically 
significant at 5% (e.g., β8 is not significant). It may be due to the definition of the GOV 
variable, since it only considers the ownership diffusion, but there are other components 
of corporate governance which can control EM, such as the size and structure of board, 
audit committee, etc.
If high discretionary accruals intensity impairs the usefulness and the timeliness of earn-
ings, our results suggest that the quality of enforcement mechanisms and the ownership 
diffusion positively affect their VR. Nevertheless, they are not enough to compensate 
completely the loss of VR due to the high accruals intensity. Results also suggest that 
the quality of such mechanisms is better able to recover usefulness of earnings for inves-
tors’ decisions than the timeliness lost due to the presence of possible EM behaviours.
Enforcement mechanisms may be considered as an important tool to improve the qual-
ity of financial information. Without an adequate enforcement “the rules remain re-
quirements only on paper” (Hope 2003). Although international standards bodies, as 
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International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), offer discretion with regard to the 
implementation of accounting enforcement systems, its proper functioning is a neces-
sary and effective tool to ensure a high degree of quality of financial information. In 
this line, Böcking et al. (2015) find that the German enforcement system is effective 
in detecting and constraining EM, and Callao and Jarne (2010) show a significant and 
negative relationship between legal enforcement and manipulation. Also, several au-
thors, as Sunder (1997) or Christensen et al. (2013), argue the importance enforcement 
mechanisms, indicating that the successful implementation of accounting standards (and 
reduced EM) resides both own rules and implementation of effective accounting en-
forcement regimes. Our results further show that the enforcement controls the negative 
effect of EM in the VR of earnings. For ownership diffusion, results are consistent with 
results obtained by Fan and Wong (2002) and Leuz et al. (2003), among others. They 
show that concentrated ownership creates conflicts between controlling owners and 
outside investors and the first report information for self-interested purposes. Thus, the 
informativeness of earnings decreases. However, in the Spanish environment the results 
are opposites (Azofra et al. 2003 or García, Gill de Albornoz 2005).
In the last part of the paper, several sensitivity analyses validate the large majority of 
our results.
In the first sensitivity, we test the robustness of our findings using as proxy of the quality 
of enforcement mechanisms the antidirectorright index (ADRI) calculated by Spamann 
(2010) revisiting data of La Porta et al. (1998). Using the price model, findings vali-
date the hypothesis that earnings management behaviours reduce the value relevance 
of earnings (α1 = +8.73; α2 = –5.45, both statistically significant at 1%) and increase 
the one of book value (α6 = +0.04, statistically significant at 1%). Both the quality of 
legal enforcement and the ownership diffusion act as moderating factors validating our 
last research hypothesis (α3 = +0.58; α4 = +3.14, both statistically significant at 1%). 
Using the return model, high discretionary accruals intensity reduces the timeliness of 
earnings (β1 = +0.49; β2 = –0.41, both statistically significant at 1%). The interaction 
terms β3 and β7 related to the quality of legal system are positive (+0.04 and +0.06) 
and statistically significant at 5%. The ownership diffusion has a similar effect but, like 
in the main analysis, weaker compared with the quality of legal systems. In fact, only 
the interaction terms β4 is positive (+0.06) and statistically significant at 1%. In Spa-
mann (2010) there is also a measure of ADRI that is calculated revising Djankov et al. 
(2008). Re-running regression using this variable as proxy of the quality of enforcement 
mechanisms results are perfectly replicated.
Also the second and the third sensitivities validate our research findings. In these tests, 
we re-run regressions using the McNichols (2002) model to identify the firms that ex-
perienced high discretionary accruals intensity or deflating the regression parameters by 
the market value at the reporting date.
In the last one, we use ordinal variables and not dummies to control for EM and for the 
quality of corporate governance and enforcement. Also in this case results are validated 
even if for book value we have not evidence of a higher value relevance in presence of 
high discretionary accruals intensity.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we provide evidence that the solution to the problem of manipulation in 
reported financial information lies not in stricter accounting rules, but rather in issues 
related with the legal system and the structure of ownership, among others. Indeed, 
the development of appropriate enforcement mechanisms in the implementation of ac-
counting rules is shown as a correction factor of EM. It needs to keep track of how 
responsible companies apply in practice the rules. These rules often allow managers to 
choose between various approaches all valid or must resort to alternative rules to cover 
certain regulatory gaps. Also, the diffusion of ownership, as a feature of the corporate 
governance of companies, is a variable to be considered to limit the negative effects 
that the EM, as we have noted, generated on the VR of the earnings. The existence of a 
more diffuse ownership structure, with lower concentration, can reduce the loss of VR 
of earnings in the presence of EM. 
The paper makes the following contributions. First, considering the market value of a 
company a convex function of earnings and book value, it provides evidence on the 
different effect of EM in the VR of earnings and in the VR of book value, due to any 
loss of VR of earnings leads investors to place more weight to book value, increasing 
its VR. Second, the paper shows the ability of enforcement and corporate governance 
to mitigate the decrease of the VR of earnings in presence of EM, although they are 
not able to compensate completely the loss of VR. Prior research has shown, on the 
one hand, that good enforcement and corporate governance have a positive effect on 
VR. On the other hand, previous papers have provided evidence on the ability of such 
mechanism to reduce EM. However, there is not prior research on the ability of enforce-
ment and corporate governance to obstruct the fall of VR due to EM.
The findings are relevant for the different economic agents: companies, investors, policy 
makers, etc. Companies often feel pressured to reach certain performance figures to 
meet the investor expectations. This pressure leads companies to manage earnings and, 
then, the VR of financial information decreases and the decisions taken by the investor 
may be wrong. Ultimately, this ends up affecting both the company and the investor. 
So, it is important for them to learn that the EM is detrimental for the VR of earnings 
and it should be avoided. Nevertheless, the reality teaches us that it is difficult to do 
away with EM, so the evidence on the effect of control mechanism in the loss of VR of 
earnings is relevant and has important implications, not only for companies and users 
but also for policy makers and institutions. 
Institutions must ensure the proper functioning of markets and the economy. So, they 
should continue curbing the information practices that do not meet certain requirements, 
to reach a more value relevant financial information that provide a better functioning of 
markets and the economy. To generate a set of high quality accounting standards it is not 
enough. It is necessary that policy makers establish adequate enforcement mechanisms 
which ensure that accounting regulation is correctly applied by managers.
The institutions and companies should promote models of governance that effectively 
act as control mechanisms of EM and of its effect on VR and are consistent with the 
corporate culture and economic context of the country. Companies must be aware of the 
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importance of providing quality information and be ready to adopt the mechanisms that 
control it. In this context, the dispersion in the ownership of the company prevents the 
existence of large shareholders to adopt criteria for information to benefit their interests 
at the same time that reduce the usefulness of accounting information. The responsibility 
for control measures of the performance of the organization involves different groups 
of shareholders and is not polarized in one.
Meanwhile, investors and other users should pay more attention to both the deficien-
cies of information as to the mechanisms, institutional and business, which are taken to 
limit them, especially in those environments and companies in which it is more likely 
to be EM.
Despite the implications of our findings, a limitation of this study is having considered 
the ownership diffusion as proxy of the quality of corporate governance. The develop-
ment of databases will facilitate the collection of other kind of data (e.g., board diver-
sity), and will avoid small sample size and single-country context that are necessitated 
by manual data collection. Another future line of research could analyse the effect of 
EM in VR of earnings and the power of the different control mechanism by country. It 
would be interesting to know if the conclusions obtained for the countries considered 
as a whole are the same or not for each country in the sample individually considered. 
We cannot forget that economic, legal, social and cultural environment is not exactly 
the same in all countries, although they are all belonging to the EU. So, although ac-
counting rules are the same in all countries, how the companies apply the rules in each 
country may be different, the vision of EM practices could also be different, as well as 
the enforcement, the ownership structure or corporate governance features.
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